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The Constitutionality of School Corporal Punishment of
Children as a Betrayal of Brown v. Board of Education
Susan H. Bitensky*
I. INTRODUCTION
American judicial history, like any institutional history, has had its
shameful moments and its glorious ones, with plenty in-between. Some
of the worst and best of these decisions have concerned race relations.
Consider such low points for the United States Supreme Court as Dred
Scott v. Sandford' and the Japanese-American restriction cases.2 The
former, among other things, essentially upheld slavery as constitutional 3
while the latter upheld the constitutionality of the mass internment of
and curfew imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry who lived on
the West Coast during World War I. 4  Even taking into account that
these decisions were creatures of other, more backward eras, their
* Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. B.A. 1971, Case Western
Reserve University; J.D. 1974, University of Chicago Law School. I would like to thank Danielle
Gross for her excellent research assistance.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
2. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (affirming the United States war
power right to exclude persons of Japanese ancestry from military areas); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding curfew restrictions against persons of Japanese ancestry in
military areas).
3. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05, 411, 425-27, 450-51 (ruling that descendants of American
slaves were neither "citizens" nor "persons" within the meaning of the Constitution and that when
Congress outlawed slavery in federal territory, the result was a deprivation of slaveholders'
"property" under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution subsequently nullified Dred Scott's rulings with
respect to slavery. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits slavery in the United States. U.S.
CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment states that any person born or naturalized
in the United States is a citizen of the United States. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
4. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217-19 (upholding the constitutionality of exclusion of persons
of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast regardless of their individual loyalty to the United
States during World War II); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93-102 (upholding the constitutionality of
curfews imposed upon persons of Japanese ancestry residing on the West Coast regardless of
individual loyalty to the United States during World War II). But see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S.
283, 297, 300-04 (1944) (holding that the War Relocation Authority had no authority to subject a
person of Japanese ancestry, who was undisputedly loyal to the United States during World War
II, to its procedure for obtaining leave from internment).
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remembrance is still enough to make one wince.5
Brown v. Board of Education6 ("Brown I") is, in my opinion, one of
the United States Supreme Court's redeeming glorious moments. The
holding, stripped to its barest essentials, is that de jure racial segregation
of students in public elementary and secondary schools inherently
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 In
so ruling, the Court effectively repudiated its own long-held doctrine,
previously articulated in Plessy v. Ferguson,8 that so-called separate but
equal facilities for whites and blacks are constitutional. 9 The Court not
only halted its own retrogressive momentum, but it also put itself in the
vanguard of the nascent struggle for civil rights in a nation that was
badly divided on the issue. 10 For among whites at that time, the
dominant sentiments toward racial segregation were represented by
apathy in the North and sympathy in the South.l'
The story surrounding how Brown I came to be and how it has been
implemented is, however, somewhat less glorious than the landmark
5. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism's Forgotten Past, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 151 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) [hereinafter
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES] (describing the Dred Scott Court's conclusions as sullying "the
Court's reputation" and labeling them "a disaster"); Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu: The
Japanese-American Cases, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 249, 257 (Michael C. Doff ed.,
2004) (observing that the military's internment of persons of Japanese ancestry, upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Korematsu, was "racist").
6. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].
7. Id. at 495. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
8. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 548-49, 552 (1896) (upholding under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment Louisiana's racial segregation of railroad
passengers on the theory that the facilities could be separate for the races and, at the same time,
equal).
9. Brown I did not expressly overrule Plessy, but its effect in the educational context was
much the same as if it had done so. See 3 RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.8, at 331 (3d ed. 1999).
10. See JAMES T. PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS
MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 6-7 (2001) (describing the late 1940s and early 1950s
as the beginnings of the full-fledged civil rights movement of later years); see also Nathaniel R.
Jones, The Harlan Dissent: The Road Not Taken-An American Tragedy, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
951, 959 (1996) (remarking that in the 1930s and 1940s the civil rights movement mostly took
the form of litigation undermining Plessy, thus reflecting discontent among blacks well before the
1950s when the civil rights movement began to burgeon).
II. See PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 7-8 (describing how public opinion polls from the
1950s revealed increasing support from northern whites for liberal policies concerning race, but
that advocates had trouble "arousing active backing from white Northerners"); see also Robert A.
Leflar & Wylie H. Davis, Segregation in the Public Schools-1953, 67 HARV. L. REV. 377, 421
(1954) (describing the majority of the residents of southern states as favoring racial segregation of
the schools in the early 1950s).
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decision itself. In 1952, the Supreme Court was first presented with the
prospect of ruling on the constitutionality of cases that came to
comprise Brown L.12 Evidence suggests that the Vinson Court, so
divided on so many issues in 1952, was likely to bring further
divisiveness to deciding the constitutionality of public school racial
segregation. 13  The Court delayed before ordering rehearings of the
cases in 1953.14 Nevertheless, political events were weighing on the
Court to get the cases decided and decided the right way. On the
domestic front, the Court faced the beginnings of a more vocal and
restive civil rights movement in the black community. 15 Additionally,
considerable international embarrassment arose from tolerating
legalized racial segregation on American soil after fighting racially
supremacist, anti-semitic Nazis and prosecuting them at Nuremberg. 16
In other words, the Court, rather than leaping at the chance to lead,
rather gingerly found its way into forging a more enlightened chapter of
race relations in the education context.
The saga of Brown l's implementation has been, in my opinion, even
more disappointing than the story of its genesis. Although in the
remedial phase of the litigation, Brown v. Board of Education17
("Brown H"), the Court remanded to the district courts and directed
12. PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 45-46, 52.
13. See id. at 54-56 (discussing individual justices and their divergent views in the 1950s); See
also Daniel Gyebi, A Tribute to Courage on the Fortieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education, 38 How. L.J. 23, 37 n.83 (1994) (noting the 5-4 Supreme Court split led by Chief
Justice Vinson in favor of upholding segregation); Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really
Happened in Brown v. Board of Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1870-72 (1991)
(discussing Chief Justice Vinson's inability to lead or unify the Supreme Court).
14. PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 57 (discussing that the reason for a scheduled re-hearing in
June 1953 was so that Supreme Court Justices, notably Justice Frankfurter, could reflect on the
intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning schools); Tushnet & Lezin, supra
note 13, at 1872, 1908-09.
15. PATrERSON, supra note 10, at 56; See also Michael J. Klarman, Twentieth-Century
Constitutional History: Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV.
7, 14, 16-21 (1994); Derrick A. Bell, Comment, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 524-25 (1980).
16. See PATTERSON, supra note 10, at 56 (discussing that racial segregation in the United
States made the "Jim Crow America vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy when it claimed to
lead the Free World"); Steve Bachmann, Rights on Trial, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1608 (1984)
(book review) (discussing the conflict in the mid-1950s between the United States's role as
"leader of the free world" and the apparent lack of freedom for segregated black people in the
South); Bert B. Lockwood, Jr., The United Nations Charter and United States Civil Rights
Litigation, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901, 941 (1984) (quoting from the government's brief in Henderson
v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950), "[o]ur position and standing before the critical bar of
world opinion are weakened if segregation not only is practiced in this country but also is
condoned by federal law").
17. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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them to take measures so that petitioners could, with "all deliberate
speed,"' 8 be admitted on a racially non-discriminatory basis to the
schools involved, the parties to many subsequent school desegregation
cases hardly took this standard to heart. The law books are littered with
court decisions mandating grossly recalcitrant school boards to
implement Brown L19 Some of the court decisions themselves arguably
impeded progress by declining to order more thorough-going remedial
measures. 20 But that is another topic for another scholar on another day.
I merely raise this context to show that there has been no shortage of
obstacles to Brown l's development, even when it was only a gleam in
Thurgood Marshall's eye. Now, some obstacles are intentionally
created and some are unwittingly created. Many of the obstacles
referenced above seem to belong in the intentional category. This
article will focus from here, however, on a roadblock of the unwitting
variety.
II. INGRAHAM V. WRIGHT
The particular impediment to Brown I's effectuation that I wish to
address is Ingraham v. Wright,2 1 a 1977 Supreme Court decision that,
on its face, has absolutely nothing to do with racial integration or
harmony. In this case, petitioners James Ingraham and Roosevelt
18. Id. at 301.
19. See, e.g., Alexander v. Holmes Co. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1969) (per curiam),
reh'g denied, 396 U.S. 976 (1969); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 431-35, 437-42
(1968); Griffin v. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 220-225, 231-33 (1964),
mot'n granted, 377 U.S. 950 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 7-16 (1958). For a listing
and summary of such cases, see 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 9, § 18.9, at 343, 344 &
nn.14-15.
20. See Susan H. Bitensky, We "Had a Dream" in Brown v. Board of Education..., 1996
DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3-4, 13 [hereinafter Bitensky, Dream] (explaining that the
expectations and aspirations naturally inspired by Brown have, after forty-two years, remained
substantially unfulfilled); Kevin Brown, Do African-Americans Need Immersion Schools?: The
Paradoxes Created by Legal Conceptualization of Race and Public Education, 78 IOWA L. REV.
813, 817-18 (1993) (describing that new reports indicate that schools were just as segregated in
1990 as they were in the 1970s); Chris Hansen, Are the Courts Giving Up? Current Issues in
School Desegregation, 42 EMORY L.J. 863, 867-69 (1993) (discussing the pre-existing views of
judges when making decisions); Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional
Ghetto, 1993 W tS. L. REV. 627, 638-56 (1993) (discussing courts' different doctrinal
components in assessing school segregation); Sonia R. Jarvis, Brown and the Afrocentric
Curriculum, 101 YALE L.J. 1285, 1285-86, 1289-91 (1992) (stating that "the Supreme Court has
demonstrated increasing antipathy toward race-conscious remedies designed to overcome
discrimination in education, employment, and housing"); Donald E. Lively, The Effectuation and
Maintenance of Integrated Schools: Modern Problems in a Post-Desegregation Society, 48 OHIO
ST. L.J. 117, 125-27 (1987) (discussing the consciousness of race while making judicial
decisions concerning variants of segregation in schools).
21. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
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Andrews were students at a public junior high school in Florida. 22 The
state of Florida at that time had a statute permitting corporal punishment
in schools as long as it was not "degrading or unduly severe" or was not
administered without consulting the principal.23 Because he did not
follow his teacher's directions with the desired alacrity, Ingraham
received more than twenty licks with a paddle on his clothed buttocks
while being pinned to a table in the principal's office.24 As a result, he
developed a hematoma requiring medical intervention and necessitating
his absence from school for several days. 25 Andrews was also paddled
several times, sometimes on his arms, for minor violations of school
rules.26 In one of these disciplinary sessions, he was hit so hard that he
lost the full use of his arm for a week.27 The paddle, by the way, was a
flat, wooden affair approximately two feet long, three to four inches
wide, and one-half inch thick.28
The Supreme Court agreed to hear two of petitioners' claims in the
ensuing suit.29 The first claim was that corporal punishment of public
school students as a disciplinary technique constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. 30
The second claim was that administering such punishment without first
giving students notice and an opportunity to be heard violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31 The Supreme Court
rejected both claims. 32
For purposes of making the argument that the Ingraham ruling
betrayed the promise of Brown I, it is necessary only to focus on the
Ingraham Court's treatment of the Eighth Amendment issue. That
22. Id. at 653.
23. Id. at 657 n.6 (quoting Florida's statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 232.27 (1961), as of the
1970-71 academic year, governing corporal punishment in the schools).
24. See id. at 657 (holding that "school authorities viewed corporal punishment as a less
drastic means of discipline than suspension or explusion").
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 656.
29. See id. at 658-59 (discussing that one count was a class action, while the other counts
were individual damages actions concerning the Eighth Amendment). Petitioners' other claim
was that public school corporal punishment is a substantive due process violation. See id. at 659
n.12 (denying the review of the third question presented in the petition for certiorari: "Is the
infliction of severe corporal punishment upon public students arbitrary, capricious and unrelated
to achieving any legitimate educational purpose and therefore violative of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment?").
30. Id. at 659-60.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 671, 682.
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Amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted., 33 The Court essentially had one rationale for its disposition
of the Eighth Amendment issue. However, before explaining that
rationale, the Court seemingly strayed into a survey of "traditional
common-law concepts" and "the 'attitude(s) which our society has
traditionally taken"' towards corporal punishment of children in
school.3 4 The Court found the practice to be deeply entrenched in our
history, dating back to the colonial period and continuing in most parts
of the United States right up until the Ingraham opinion.
35
Acknowledging that professional as well as popular opinion had been at
odds for over a century on the advisability of such punishment, 36 the
Court concluded that "we can discern no trend toward its elimination.
' 37
The Court likewise found the prevailing common law principle
governing the use of this punishment in 1977 to hail as far back as the
American Revolution or earlier,38 i.e., the principle being that school
personnel may inflict reasonable, although not excessive force, to
discipline children; excessive force, however, subjects the punishers to
potential civil and criminal liability.
39
Why the Court went into this historical exegesis on the status of
corporal punishment of schoolchildren in the United States is not
entirely clear. The Court purportedly did not consider this description
as part of its constitutional analysis under the Eighth Amendment,
characterizing the whole exercise as "this background of historical and
contemporary approval of reasonable corporal punishment."'4  It is
intriguing why the Court felt compelled to set the stage so elaborately.
One is left with the impression that this was not merely a stage set, but
rather was tacitly integral to the Eighth Amendment analysis. That is,
because the Court viewed school corporal punishment as a long-
standing feature of the American experience, it became legally and
politically more comfortable for the Justices to deny children the Eighth
Amendment's protection against the practice. Such a ruling consonant
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
34. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 659 (quoting Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968)).
35. Id. at 660.
36. Id. at 660-61.
37. Id. at 661.
38. Id.
39. See id. (discussing that "[a]t common law, a single principle has governed the use of
corporal punishment since before the American Revolution: teachers may impose reasonable but
not excessive force to discipline a child").
40. Id. at 663.
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with United States history could not, after all, open the Court to charges
of social engineering that were alien to the nation's traditional
normative prejudices on the subject.
In any event, the Supreme Court's acknowledged rationale for
rejecting petitioners' Eighth Amendment claim was that the
Amendment's guarantee against cruel and unusual punishments is a
constraint exclusively on criminal punishments and therefore cannot be
extended to protect children from public school disciplinary
punishments. 4 1 According to the majority opinion, the stinginess of the
Eighth Amendment's reach is supported by original intent42 and stare
decisis.43 As to the latter, the Ingraham Court specified that its previous
Eighth Amendment decisions had limited the criminal process in three
ways." First, the decisions limit the type of punishment that can be
imposed on convicts. 45  Second, they bar penalties grossly
disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime.46 Finally, they place
substantive limits on what activities can be classified as criminal and
punished by the criminal justice system.47
Petitioners argued that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment could
not have imagined the modern American compulsory public school
system and its power to mete out non-criminal punishments.48  The
inference, of course, is that had the Framers known, surely they would
have desired to protect schoolchildren at least as much as they did
prisoners. The Court attempted to counter this argument by
distinguishing prisoners' life situations from those of schoolchildren:
The schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth
Amendment. Though attendance may not always be voluntary, the
public school remains an open institution. Except perhaps when very
young, the child is not physically restrained from leaving school
during school hours; and at the end of the school day, the child is
invariably free to return home. Even while at school, the child brings
with him the support of family and friends and is rarely apart from
teachers and other pupils who may witness and protest any instances
of mistreatment.49
41. Id. at 664-71.
42. Id. at 664-66.
43. Id. at 666-68.
44. Id. at 667.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 667.
48. Id. at 668-69.
49. Id. at 670.
2004]
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I will put to one side, for the moment, the various weaknesses in the
Ingraham majority's reasoning outlined above. There are urgent
reasons for exposing Ingraham's problematic nature and a full expose
of those problems will follow an explanation of the connection between
Brown I and Ingraham.
III. THE CONNECTION: BROWN I AND INGRAHAM
So, what is the relationship between Brown I and Ingraham? Brown
I's barebones holding is that de jure racial segregation of children in
public elementary and secondary schools violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 50  The factual linchpin of the
Court's holding is the unanimous opinion's famous footnote eleven
which references various social science publications supporting the
proposition that racial segregation of children at these levels of
schooling causes African-American children to feel inferior; these
inferiority feelings, in turn, undermine the motivation of black children
to learn and impedes their "educational and mental development" in a
way "unlikely ever to be undone." 51
Thus, the whole foundation for Brown I's holding on segregated
schools is a fervent concern that the schools should imbue children,
especially black children, with a positive sense of their intellectual
worth and should provide them with a commensurate quality of
educational experience. Specifically, the Court described the sort of
education that children should be positioned to take advantage of: an
education that prepares them for "good citizenship," that initiates them
into the ranks of the culturally literate, and that gives them the
grounding for "later professional training." 52 Note that an education of
this ilk is not limited to the basics, but rather entails a well-rounded and
sophisticated curriculum designed to help all children mature into
personally fulfilled adults who will be able to make meaningful
contributions to society.53 The Brown I decision was contextual, and
50. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (remarking that segregation in public
education violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
51. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.l 1 (1954) (quoting from a Kansas
lower court in the Brown I litigation).
52. Id. at 493.
53. See Bitensky, Dream, supra note 20, at 6, nn.25-26 (stating how quality education
prepares students for life and active community participation); David Chang, The Bus Stops Here:
Defining the Constitutional Right of Equal Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate
Remedial Process, 63 B.U. L. REV. 1, 33-34 (1983) (discussing how education aids people in
acquiring skills that are rewarded in society and equips blacks to compete in society); Marvin P.
Dawkins & Jomills H. Braddock II, The Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial
Composition and Arican-American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. NEGRO EDUC. 394, 394,
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that context was a concern for a high standard of education in the public
schools and for black children's receptive psychological condition as a
predicate to benefiting from such an education. Desegregation that
would result in racially-integrated schoolhouses offering substandard
education or even offering excellent education to children
psychologically unable to profit from it would be an incomplete, if not
perverse, realization of Brown I's import. This concern is the more
subtle part of Brown l's holding, what Professor Robert Sedler has
dubbed Brown I's "educational rationale," 54 and what I would also call
its "psychological enabling component."
The constitutional standard which apparently should follow from this
aspect of Brown I is that meaningful equal protection must involve
public elementary and secondary schools in a process of psychological
enabling: that is, psychologically enabling African-American children
to have the confidence to succeed in a superior educational milieu. At
the very least, the post-Brown I Equal Protection Clause should be
understood to prohibit public schools from doing anything to deride or
undercut that confidence.
Ingraham significantly hinders the fruition of Brown l's commitment
to educational excellence and psychological enabling. Recall the
Ingraham Court's holding that the Eighth Amendment does not protect
children in any way from corporal punishment in the nation's public
elementary and secondary schools.55 As of this writing, slightly under
one-half of the states have availed themselves of Ingraham's latitude by
403 (1994) (remarking how desegregation has a positive effect on career goals and social
assimilation); Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of
Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1050, 1053 (1984) (discussing the psychological and academic
harm that results from segregated schools). But see Brown, supra note 20, at 837-38 (contending
that Brown I may actually have impeded African-American empowerment because the Court
focused on the notion that racial segregation retards the intellectual development only of minority
children).
54. Robert A. Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big
Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U. L.Q. 535, 543
(1975). Professor Sedler wrote: "The Supreme Court in Brown had proceeded upon the
educational rationale that racial segregation was harmful to black children because it deprived
them 'of some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system."' Id. at
548 (quoting Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494). See also Robert William Gall, The Past Should Not
Shackle the Present: The Revival of a Legacy of Religious Bigotry by Opponents of School
Choice, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 413, 437 (2003) (referring to Brown l's commitment to
providing all children with "a quality education"); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, The Heart of Equal
Protection: Education and Race, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1, 4-5 (1997) (describing
Brown I as a "profound statement about the importance of a quality education to a child's
welfare," a principle "essential to the case").
55. See supra notes 30, 32 and accompanying text (explaining that the Ingraham court
rejected the claim that corporal punishment of public school children as a disciplinary technique
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
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enacting legislation permitting corporal punishment of children in the
schools.5 6 This situation, I submit, is a conducive strategy-equally as
conducive as segregation-for making African-American children feel
inferior and thereby stifling their intellectual growth.
How can that be? What is the basis for making such an assertion?
The first thing to remark by way of explanation is that the most recent
scientific evidence has dispositively established that corporal
punishment of children, regardless of its venue or the racial identity of
the children, is correlated with ten seriously adverse psychological
outcomes for the child-victims. In 2002, psychologist Dr. Elizabeth
Gershoff published meta-analyses that established an association
between parental corporal punishment of children and (1) decreased
moral internalization, (2) increased child aggression, (3) increased child
delinquent and antisocial conduct, (4) decreased quality of the parent-
child relationship, (5) decreased child mental health, (6) increased risk
of undergoing conventional physical child abuse; and, upon reaching
maturity, (7) increased adult aggression, (8) increased adult criminal
and antisocial behavior, (9) decreased adult mental health, and (10)
increased risk of abusing one's own child or spouse.57 She has since
theorized that, in light of some of the parallels between the parent-child
and teacher-student relationship, these negative impacts may result from
56. See Center for Effective Discipline, U.S. Statistics on Corporal Punishment by State and
Race: States Banning Corporal Punishment, a t http://www.stophitting.org/disatschool/
statesBanning.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Center for Effective Discipline, States
Banning] (discussing state statistics on corporal punishment in the United States). Idaho,
Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, Missouri, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Indiana permit corporal punishment statewide. Id.
Wyoming, Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania have corporal punishment on a district-by-district basis, but more than half of
students live in districts without corporal punishment. Id. For the sake of clarity, it should be
pointed out that states that still permit school corporal punishment do just that-they permit
rather than mandate such punishment. No states require corporal punishment of misbehaving
students. See, e.g., Andre R. Imbrogno, Corporal Punishment in America's Public Schools and
the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Case for Nonratification, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 125,
129 (2000) (discussing that the "amount and severity of corporal punishment has decreased in the
twentieth century" in American schools and that even the states which do permit corporal
punishment in schools do not require the use of physical force in disciplining students); Kathryn
R. Urbonya, Determining Reasonableness Under the Fourth Amendment: Physical Force to
Control and Punish Students, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 397, 427-32 (2001) (discussing
that, as of 2001, nineteen states expressly forbade corporal punishment in schools and only two
states directly allowed school officials to use physical discipline).
57. Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and Associated Child
Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review, 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539,
543-44 (2002).
[Vol. 36
School Corporal Punishment
school corporal punishment as well.58
It does not require a degree in psychology to figure out that some of
these outcomes will indispose children to learn optimally or even
minimally. For example, an overly aggressive child or a child plagued
by emotional instability is sure to be distracted by more pressing urges
and needs than soaking up the school curricula. As a matter of fact,
Professor Irwin Hyman, a psychologist who has extensively studied
school corporal punishment, has concluded that corporal punishment
does indeed interfere with students' ability to do schoolwork.5 9
I suppose putting children at risk of these insalubrious outcomes
might be warranted if the scientific evidence also disclosed some
extraordinary advantage unique to physical punishment, or if there was
no other means of disciplining students. Nobody on either side of the
spanking debate wants to deprive children of beneficial discipline or to
turn schools into dens of iniquity or chaos. Dr. Gershoff's meta-
analyses do reveal that corporal punishment is correlated with one
arguably positive outcome: a smack will cause a child temporarily to
cease his or her misconduct. 60 Since cessation is fleeting, however, this
outcome is hardly the type of advantage that would justify endangering
children in the ways identified by Dr. Gershoff.
Moreover, there are more effective alternative disciplinary techniques
for controlling children and instilling them with moral values. Schools
have at their disposal an array of traditional non-corporal penalties that
may be imposed such as expulsion, suspension, detention and parental
pick-ups. 61 Time-outs, deprivation of privileges, and explaining why
misbehavior is unacceptable can readily be adapted to the school
context. 62  There are also programs especially suitable to employing
58. Email from Dr. Elizabeth Gershoff, Dept. of Social Work, University of Michigan, to
Susan H. Bitensky, Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law, 1 (Sept. 1,
2004).
59. See IRWIN A. HYMAN, READING, WRITING, AND THE HICKORY STICK: THE APPALLING
STORY OF PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ABUSE IN AMERICAN SCHOOLS 96, 99 (1990)
(stating that approximately seventy percent of students with traumatic stress symptoms tend to
have problems with academic performance); see also Murray A. Straus, New Evidence for the
Benefits of Never Spanking, SOCIETY, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 52, 55-56 (asserting that there is
evidence that corporal punishment of young children may undermine the foundations for
cognitive development so that these children will continue to have difficulties with cognitive
skills later in childhood).
60. Gershoff, supra note 57, at 543-44.
61. See Center for Effective Discipline, School Corporal Punishment Alternatives, at
http://stophitting.com/disatschool/altematives.php (last visited July 15, 2004) (discussing school
corporal punishment alternatives and misbehavior prevention) [hereinafter Center for Effective
Discipline, Punishment Alternatives].
62. Cf MICHAEL J. MARSHALL, WHY SPANKING DOESN'T WORK: STOPPING THE BAD HABIT
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school resources. These programs include providing character
education curriculum, enlisting the assistance of school psychologists
and counselors, giving student recognition awards for good behavior,
and peer mediation. 63
Dr. Gershoff's scientific findings, however, apply to all children. On
what grounds, then, can I argue that Ingraham and its legacy has
particularly and uniquely disadvantaged black schoolchildren? Those
grounds lie in American history and in the racial bias with which school
corporal punishment is presently administered. It is an undisputed
historical fact that in the antebellum South it was de rigueur for
slaveholders to whip or beat their slaves with impunity.64 Apparently,
slaveholders believed that physical coercion would produce docility
without offending moral or legal precepts because the victims were
slaves. One historian has instructed that the lash was the primary means
of controlling slaves. 65 Another has revealed that the practice was so
pervasive that many slaves actually conceptualized freedom as
"abolition of punishment by the lash."'66 Moreover, although the Civil
War put an end to slavery, it did not stop whites' corporal punishment
of blacks. Freed slaves were still frequently hit,67 especially if they had
AND GETTING THE UPPER HAND ON EFFECTIVE DISCIPLINE 123 (2002) (recommending that
parents should try time-out and revoking privileges to discipline their children); JANE NELSEN, ET
AL., POSITIVE DISCIPLINE A-Z: 1001 SOLUTIONS TO EVERYDAY PARENTING PROBLEMS, 5,
23-26 (1993) (suggesting that parents should use family discussions and time-out in disciplining
their children).
63. Center for Effective Discipline, Punishment Alternatives, supra note 61.
64. Everette Swinney, Suppressing the Ku Klux Klan*: The Enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments 1870-1874, in AMERICAN LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY:
A GARLAND SERIES OF OUTSTANDING DISSERTATIONS 36-37 (Harold Hyman, et al. eds., 1987).
For additional historical accounts of the flogging of slaves, see JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE
SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 251 (1979); FREDERICK
DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 52, 121 (Rayford W. Logan ed.,
1962) (1892); PAGE SMITH, THE NATION COMES OF AGE, 615-16 (1981); Aremona G. Bennett,
Phantom Freedom: Official Acceptance of Violence to Personal Security and Subversion of
Proprietary Rights and Ambitions Following Emancipation, 1865-1910, 70 CHI. KENT L. REV.
439, 440 (1994).
65. Swinney, supra note 64, at 36-37.
66. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at
78 (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988).
67. See DONALD G. NIEMAN, TO SET THE LAW IN MOTION: THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF BLACKS, 1865-1868 passim (Harold M. Hyman & William P. Hobby
eds., 1979) (giving examples of freedmen beaten and shot like wild animals); GEORGE C. RABLE,
BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 72-
73 (1984) (stating that freedmen were shot and whipped to influence votes); ALLEN W.
TRELEASE, WHITE TERROR: THE K U KLUX KLAN CONSPIRACY AND SOUTHERN
RECONSTRUCTION passim (Kenneth B. Clark, ed., 1971) (discussing incidents of blacks being
lashed, beaten, and murdered); Swinney, supra note 64, at 51-52, 208-09, 217-18, 279
(remarking that the Klan was responsible for hundreds of whippings in the late 1870s).
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the temerity to achieve economic success or to exercise their political
and legal rights.68 As one observer described upon touring the newly
defeated South, corporal punishment of blacks remained a "habit so
inveterate with a great many persons as to render, on the least
provocation, the impulse to whip a negro almost irresistible."
69
During Reconstruction, the Ku Klux Klan and other like-minded
ruffians terrorized the southern black population and its allies.70 These
vigilantes thought nothing of intimidating and assaulting entire black
families. 7 1  The Klan persecuted freedmen and freedwomen with a
repertoire of shootings, lynchings, and whippings, as well as with more
outlandish crimes.72  "Whipping, however, appears to have continued
from the days of slavery as a favorite, if not almost reflexive, means" of
keeping black Southerners under white thumbs.73  The extent of this
violence against blacks, even after emancipation, cannot be overstated.
After the war, this became such a problem that Congress was moved to
enact a series of statutes crafted to halt these and other continuing
transgressions against blacks.
74
Thus, for black schoolchildren in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, corporal punishment has been and is loaded with connotations
of racism, hate, and oppression. Corporal punishment reverberates with
the collective historical experience of blacks writhing under the rod
during slavery and its aftermath. Indeed, incidents of Klan beatings of
68. See TRELEASE, supra note 67, passim (discussing incidents of blacks being lashed, beaten,
and murdered).
69. 1 CARL SCHURZ, Report on the Condition of the South, in SPEECHES, CORRESPONDENCE
AND POLITICAL PAPERS OF CARL SCHURZ 279, 316 (Frederic Bancroft ed., 1913).
70. FONER, supra note 66, at 425-36; Swinney, supra note 64, at 46-48; TRELEASE, supra
note 67, at xxxiv.
71. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 437-38 (1871) (statement of Rep. Cobb); FONER,
supra note 66, at 119, 427, 429-30; NIEMAN, supra note 67, at 124; TRELEASE, supra note 67,
passim.
72. FONER, supra note 66, at 426-31; DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY":
PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 24-28, 100 (1996); RABLE, supra
note 67, at 28-30, 98; TRELEASE, supra note 67, passim; Swinney, supra note 64, at 48, 208-09,
216-17, 250.
73. Susan H. Bitensky, Section 1983: Agent of Peace or Vehicle of Violence Against
Children?, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 334 (2001) [hereinafter Bitensky, Agent of Peace].
74. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (stating that any injured
party who was deprived of their rights now has redress under the laws); Reconstruction Act of
1867, ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867) (calling for an Act that called for military forces to suppress
insurrections); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (declaring blacks are citizens
of the United States and have the rights and protections of freedmen); Freedman's Bureau Act of
1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865) (establishing a War Department to control all subjects relating
to freedmen).
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blacks continued right into the twentieth century. 75  Not unlike the
Klan's cross burnings in its black neighbors' yards, 76  corporal
punishment of American black schoolchildren is fraught with odious
meanings and implications not readily apparent to their white
counterparts. And, these are meanings and implications of
objectification of blacks as "property," or, if not "property,"
objectification of these children as holding some kind of sub-human
status.
77
To add insult to injury, statistics for the 1999-2000 academic year
show that "[b]lack students are hit at a rate that is more than twice their
makeup in the population. Blacks comprise 17% of students, but
receive 39% of paddlings. Whites make up 62% of all students, but
receive 53% of the corporal punishment." 78  Along similar lines, a
Memphis City Schools study published in 2004 shows that in the
Memphis school district, "[b]lack students and boys were
overwhelmingly more likely to get spanked than their white and female
counterparts. Roughly 97% of the 27,918 paddlings last year were
given to the district's black children, while only 2% were given to white
children." 79 The fact that corporal punishment both resurrects a semi-
chattel status for blacks and in modern times is used at least twice as
frequently on black pupils as on white students can only compound the
toll that this form of punishment takes on black children's self-esteem
and aspirations.
If ever a pedagogical practice was to carry the potential for making
African-American schoolchildren feel inferior and for thwarting their
opportunity for educational progress, corporal punishment would seem
to be that practice. Allowing such punishment to persist in the schools
is hardly the psychological enabling of individual educational potential
that Brown I requires. 80 In giving public schools carte blanche approval
75. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354-55 (2003) (plurality opinion) (O'Connor, J.,
opinion of the Court) (discussing acts of Klan violence occurring in the 1920s and during the civil
rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s); See id. at 389-90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
the Klan's use of violence in the 1900s).
76. See id. at 352-57 & 360 n.2 (recognizing a burning cross as a symbol of hate and white
supremacy).
77. See SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS
VIOLATION (forthcoming 2005).
78. Center for Effective Discipline, States Banning, supra note 56. I was advised of the year
for which the above-referenced statistics are valid by the Executive Director of the Center for
Effective Discipline. Telephone Interview with Nadine Block, Executive Director, Center for
Effective Discipline (Feb. 4, 2004).
79. Ruma Banerji Kumar, Paddling May Not Really Be Last Resort, Data Show, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 27, 2004 at B 1.
80. See supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (discussing how corporal punishment
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to use corporal punishment on children as far as the Eighth Amendment
is concerned, Ingraham v. Wright represents the dashing of Brown l's
rich potential and of its chief concerns.
Ingraham does not interfere, of course, with the political discretion of
individual states to outlaw school corporal punishment. But, in the
absence of Eighth Amendment restraints, approximately half of the
states have seen fit to allow such punishment;81 although, of these, some
states have delegated power to local school districts to prohibit the
punishment on a district-by-district basis.82  The result is that in many
areas of the United States, school corporal punishment
continues-meaning that many black schoolchildren cannot fully
benefit from Brown I's psychological enabling component. Moreover,
the Ingraham holding telegraphs quite a punch to the black community,
including its children. The Ingraham holding plays a deleterious
pedagogical role in conveying that the U.S. Constitution is no barrier to
the existence of the remnants of slavery and can offer no succor to the
youngest victims of slavery's legacy.83
Incidentally, in identifying the infirmities that corporal punishment
may inflict on any child, white or black, some social science researchers
hinders a child's well-being and undermines the decision of Brown 1).
81. See supra note 55-56 and accompanying text (remarking that some states still allow
corporal punishment in schools).
82. See Irwin A. Hyman et al., Paddling and Pro-Paddling Polemics: Refuting Nineteenth
Century Pedagogy, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 74, 77-78 (2002); Urbonya, supra note 56, at 427-32.
83. As I have written elsewhere:
Generally speaking, there is a pedagogical purpose inherent in virtually all law. Laws
are made to be known; otherwise, they would be ineffective as an instrument of
governance or restraint. The educational impact of law is perhaps most effectually
realized by the reciprocal interplay between law and social values. Law draws its
content from the values of the people it governs. Law assimilates not only a society's
values and priorities as they are, but also those values and priorities which comprise
that society's goals and needs. It is in this latter initiatory phase that law has its most
dramatic educative effect because it crystallizes and makes visible the norms which
constitute a society's aspirations and ideals.
Susan H. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, Embrace Our Humanity: Toward a New Legal Regime
Prohibiting Corporal Punishment of Children, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 441 (1998)
[hereinafter Bitensky, Spare the Rod]. For examples of other works on the pedagogical role of
law see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 927, 952 (W.D.
Ross trans. & Richard McKeon ed., 1941); Plato, Book VII, in THE LAWS OF PLATO 215-16
(Thomas L. Pangle trans. & ed., 1980); David R. Barnhizer, Prophets, Priests and Power
Blockers: Three Fundamental Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PITT. L.
REV. 127, 162-63 (1988); Paul Brest, The Thirty-First Cleveland-Marshall Fund Lecture:
Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 177-79 (1986); Keith Burgess-Jackson,
Bad Samaritanism and the Pedagogical Function of Law, 8 CRIM. JUST. J. 1, 3-4, 26 (1985);
Anne Norton, Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority, 55 U. CHI. L. REV.
458, 468-69 (1988); Philip Soper, The Moral Value of Law, 84 MICH. L. REV. 63, 85 (1985).
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and theorists have proposed what I have labeled the "African-American
exception." 84  They have advanced the notion that paddling does no
harm to and, in fact, is beneficial for black children in the United States
even if such punishment harms white children. 85  Proponents of the
exception frequently offer as an explanation for it that strong physical
chastisement is necessary to keep black children out of trouble in crime-
ridden environments. 8
6
I emphatically decline to adopt this relativistic approach, depending
on skin color, to corporal punishment of children. The "African-
American exception" is hardly an irrefutable fact. There are other,
equally respected social science researchers and theorists who have
posited that corporal punishment may be detrimental to black children
as well. 87 Indeed, Dr. Gershoff's recent meta-analyses have found an
association between corporal punishment of children and serious
negative behavioral outcomes regardless of the race of the children
involved,88 thereby making short work of the exceptionalists. But, even
assuming arguendo that there is a split of authority on the subject, I
would prefer to err, if error it is, on the side of repudiating a punishment
that has well-known antecedents in the whipping of American slaves.
Recommending its retention particularly for black children seems a
most grievous thing, constituting further unequal treatment of black
84. BITENSKY, Agent of Peace, supra note 73.
85. See, e.g., Marjorie Linder Gunnoe & Carrie Lea Mariner, Toward A Developmental-
Contextual Model of the Effects of Parental Spanking on Children's Aggression, 151 ARCHIVES
OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 768, 774 (1997) (reporting that corporal punishment of
African-American children deters subsequent fighting by them); Robert E. Larzelere, Child
Outcomes of Nonabusive and Customary Physical Punishment by Parents: An Updated
Literature Review, 3 CLINICAL CHILD & FAM. PSYCHOL. REV. 199, 210, 213 (2000)
(summarizing that studies show spanking to have neutral or beneficial effects on African-
American children); Arthur L. Whaley, Sociocultrual Differences in the Developmental
Consequences of the Use of Physical Discipline During Childhood for Arican-Americans, 6
CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 5, 7-10 (2000) (stating that the results of
studies concerning the effects of corporal punishment on African-American children are
inconsistent, but that none of the studies demonstrate such punishment to cause disruptive
disorders in these children).
86. See MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF THEM
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES AND ITS EFFECTS ON CHILDREN 117 (2001)
(summarizing one of the rationales of those pundits who wish to retain corporal punishment for
black children).
87. See, e.g., JAMES P. COMER & ALVIN F. POUSSAINT, RAISING BLACK CHILDREN: TWO
LEADING PSYCHIATRISTS CONFRONT THE EDUCATIONAL, SOCIAL AND EMOTIONAL PROBLEMS
FACING BLACK CHILDREN 49-51 (1992) (stating that those children punished by hitting have a
greater tendency for violence); Kristin M. McCabe et al., Family Protective Factors Among
Urban African-American Youth, 28 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 137, 139, 147 (1999).
88. See Gershoff, supra note 57, at 543-44 (indicating parental corporal punishment is
associated with undesirable behaviors and experiences).
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children, both in comparison to adults and :to children of other races.
Human beings have it in common to flinch from pain; they share
psychological reactions to being rendered simultaneously helpless and
maddened by the use of force against which there is no recourse. 89
There is a universal hunger for bodily integrity and right treatment, as
well as for a respect that recognizes each person's humanity.90 To
adopt this form of African-American exceptionalism is to deny black
children fulfillment of this fundamental aspect of their human nature
and to put them on the same footing as their enslaved ancestors. 91 This
is, of course, totally unacceptable both morally and humanistically
speaking.
IV. UNDOING INGRAHAM'S BETRAYAL OF BROWNI
Before proposing legal reform to revive Brown I's full vitality for
black children, it may be helpful for me to summarize my thesis up to
this point. Corporal punishment of black schoolchildren is laden with
historical and cultural messages that they are inferior to other children,
and these messages are reinforced by the fact that black students are
twice as likely to suffer such punishment as white students. The lack of
confidence thereby inspired in African-American students is apt to
interfere with the learning process. It was precisely the Supreme
Court's dismay over black children's harboring such inferiority feelings,
with the resultant impediment to education, that undergirded and
formed part of the holding in Brown I. When the Ingraham Court ruled
that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to public school corporal
punishment, the Court effectively sanctioned the continuation of this
practice as a constitutional matter and betrayed Brown l's potential to
equalize, truly and substantively, schooling for blacks and whites in this
country.
Can anything be done to remedy the damage Ingraham has wrought?
There is probably no way to repair the inferiority feelings and
educational loss suffered by black schoolchildren in the past. Those
children cannot have a "rerun" of their childhoods and of the
developmental milestones through which they passed under the burden
of corporal punishment. However, there are feasible and long overdue
89. Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra note 83, at 423.
90. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN PARTS I AND II 106, 149 (Herbert W. Schneider ed.,
1958) (commenting on the respect that people naturally seek from each other); IMMANUEL KANT,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 54, 56 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1974)
(1796-97) (recommending that people should regard themselves as an end rather than simply a
means and that every person ought to be his or her own master as a matter of right).
91. See generally Bitensky, Agent of Peace, supra note 73.
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measures that can be taken to spare future generations of black
schoolchildren from the same fate.
The time has come to overturn Ingraham v. Wright. Yes, I know,
stare decisis and all that. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has not shied
away from reversing course when it has perceived its direction to be
outdated and/or misguided. 92 Ingraham, a 5-4 decision to begin with,93
is ripe for overruling for several reasons in relation to its Eighth
Amendment holding. 94  First, the decision was not convincingly
reasoned when it was made in 1977. 95 Justice White's Ingraham
dissent highlights that a textualist construction of the Eighth
Amendment conflicts outright with the majority's originalist
interpretation limiting the amendment's application to criminal
proceedings-the latter interpretation created out of a patchwork of
inferences rather than from any directly relevant historical evidence. 96
Justice White explains that the Framers' failure to cabin the language of
the Amendment with the word "criminal" demonstrates that the
provision was drafted to forbid "all inhumane or barbaric punishments,
92. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-58, 561, 567 (1995) (effectively
narrowing congressional Commerce Clause power to regulating only economic activities after
decades of upholding a broader interpretation of the Clause); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833 (1976), in relation to federalism as a restraint on Congress's Commerce Clause power to
regulate state activities); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (effectively
repudiating the separate-but-equal doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
93. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
94. There seems to be an inexplicable dearth of commentary critiquing the holding of
Ingraham in relation to the Eighth Amendment. But see Lynn Roy, Chalk Talk: Corporal
Punishment in American Public Schools and the Rights of the Child, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 554,
558-59, 563 (2001) (taking the Ingraham majority to task for deviating from the Court's own
previously used standards in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, for failing to give the
amendment a "'flexible and dynamic"' construction and calling for lower federal courts to
subvert the effects of Ingraham); Margaret Meriwether Cordray, Contempt Sanctions and the
Excessive Fines Clause, 76 N.C. L. REV. 407, 447 (1998) (observing that "Ingraham's entire
discussion of the scope of the Eighth Amendment is now of dubious value" since the Court
subsequently ruled in another case that the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause governs
civil forfeiture proceedings); RONALD T. HYMAN & CHARLES H. RATHBONE, CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT IN SCHOOLS: READING THE LAW 3-4 (1993) (paraphrasing another scholar's
indictment of the Ingraham Court's Eighth Amendment analysis in Irene Merker Rosenberg,
Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 76-89 (1978));
infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (discussing the flaws of the majority's reasoning in
Ingraham).
95. HYMAN & RATHBONE, supra note 94, at 3; Roy, supra note 94, at 554, 558-59.
96. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664-66; see also Victoria J. Dodd, The Education Justice: The
Honorable Lewis Franklin Powell, Jr., 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 683, 691 (2001) (detailing that
Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in Ingraham relied upon the Virginia Declaration of Rights
of 1776 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 in ascribing meaning to the Eighth Amendment).
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no matter what the nature of the offense for which the punishment is
imposed. '97  At a minimum, Justice White's sensible textualism raises
questions about the plausibility of an originalist analysis predicated
entirely on inferences drawn by the Court.
Moreover, as Justice White observes, the Supreme Court itself has
not limited the application of the Eighth Amendment only to criminal
punishments. 98 For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,99 the Court held that
intentional disregard by correctional authorities of prisoners' medical
needs violated the Eighth Amendment's guarantee against cruel and
unusual punishments. l00  Obviously, ignoring a prisoner's medical
needs is not a judicially-imposed punishment for perpetration of a
crime. 101
Finally, the Ingraham majority opinion's attempt to immunize school
corporal punishment from Eighth Amendment strictures on the theory
that schoolchildren are in certain key ways distinguishable from
prisoners seems embarrassingly flimsy.10 2 I am not suggesting that the
Court erred because schoolchildern are subject to exactly the same
circumstances as prisoners; clearly, there are many circumstances that
are different for each group. The problem is that the particular living
conditions selected by the Court are ones actually shared by
schoolchildren and prisoners, at least to an appreciable degree. School
attendance is not, as the majority opinion suggests, sometimes
involuntary. 10 3  All states make a number of years of schooling
compulsory.' 0 4 Children, and not just the "very young" ones singled
97. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 685 (White, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 688 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
100. Id. at 104-05, 108.
101. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 688 n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that the Eighth
Amendment's application extends beyond criminal punishments).
102. Id. at 668-70.
103. Id. at 670.
104. The Ingraham majority acknowledged that compulsory education was mandated in New
England even before the American Revolution and that by 1918 compulsory school attendance
laws were in effect in all states. Id. at 661 n.14. Such laws are still in existence. See National
Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics, 2002: Ch.2. Elementary and
Secondary Education: Table 150, at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d02/tables/dt I 50.asp (last
visited Sept. 26, 2004) (containing table 150, prepared in May, 2001, covering statistics on
compulsory education in each state as of 2000, except for Colorado and the District of Columbia);
Marsha L. Levick & Francine T. Sherman, When Individual Differences Demand Equal
Treatment: An Equal Rights Approach to the Special Needs of Girls in the Juvenile Justice
System, 18 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 42 & n.189 (2003) (emphasizing that all fifty states have
compulsory education laws requiring fifteen-year olds to attend school); Judith G. McMullen,
Behind Closed Doors: Should States Regulate Homeschooling?, 54 S.C. L. REV. 75, 98 (2002)
(analyzing states' compulsory education laws in light of homeschooling).
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out by the Court, 105 are therefore restrained from leaving school during
school hours. To say, as the majority did, that a child "brings with him
[to school] the support of family and friends"'10 6 is chimerical, a notion
unsupported by any data; and more appropriate to a romantic, Norman
Rockwellian vision of the lives of American schoolchildren. Indeed,
during my stint as Associate Counsel to the New York City Board of
Education, it was quite evident that many children saw their schools as
refuges from dysfunctional, abusive and/or neglectful families and the
often anarchic neighborhoods in which they resided. The majority's
further offering that children in school have the protection of their
teachers, 10 7 strikes me as a ridiculous distinction since it is usually the
teachers who do the punishing.
Ill-conceived when it was decided in 1977, Ingraham has become
increasingly absurd. For example, consider it in comparison to the
Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Hudson v. McMillian.10 8 In that case,
a prison inmate was beaten by security guards while he was handcuffed
and shackled.' 09 The guards punched him in the mouth, eyes, chest, and
stomach, and kicked him from behind. 1"0 As a result, the victim
suffered minor bruises and swelling, some loosened teeth, and a crack in
his partial dental plate.'1 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the use of force to be excessive but refused
to rule for the prisoner because his injuries were minor, requiring no
medical attention.112 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the use
of excessive force against a prisoner may constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation even though the prisoner's injuries, which must
be more than de minimis, are minor. 113 In contrast, in Ingraham a
schoolchild who suffered injuries requiring medical intervention after
being paddled over twenty times was denied recourse to an Eighth
Amendment claim." 4 Putting Ingraham together with Hudson creates
the bizarre situation in which convicted criminals are afforded more
protection against violence in prison than children are provided in
school. Something is very wrong with this picture, and the defect is in
105. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 670.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. at 9-10.
114. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 657 (1977).
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Ingraham, not Hudson.
Ill-conceived when Ingraham was decided in 1977 and made absurd
by juxtaposition of the Hudson case in 1992, it is now fair to say that
Ingraham has become a complete anachronism in 2004. No, that is too
kind. Ingraham is rotting on the vine and continuing to damage lives in
the process. There is no reason why, under the Supreme Court's own
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Ingraham should not be long gone.
It is well accepted that the cryptic phraseology of "cruel and unusual
punishments" in the Eighth Amendment can best be meaningfully
interpreted and applied by resorting to sources beyond the Constitution
itself. The Supreme Court has determined that the Clause "must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" 115 and that it's meaning may be updated
"as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice."116
Standards of decency and humanity do evolve. They are affected by
increasing knowledge and by a populace's gravitation, sometimes
sudden and sometimes incremental, toward altered practices. There are
signs that a palpable evolution has taken place within the United States
in relation to corporal punishment of children-signs that were not
present when Ingraham was decided in 1977. Our knowledge base has
undergone a radical expansion with respect to understanding corporal
punishment's possible detrimental outcomes for children, as disclosed
by Gershoff's meta-analyses. 117  Commentators have begun sharpening
our awareness of corporal punishment's link to slavery and racism. 118
There is a growing consensus among child-care and other professionals
in the United States that school corporal punishment should be
forbidden. 19 And, unlike the situation in 1977 when only two states
115. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); accord Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
311-12 (2002); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 742 (2002) (referring to the Eighth
Amendment's import in terms of contemporary values of decency, dignity and civilization).
116. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
117. Gershoff, supra note 57, at 544-48.
118. See, e.g., STRAUS & DONNELLY, supra note 86, at 117 (asserting that "corporal
punishment has become a part of black culture in response to slavery and oppression"); Bitensky,
Agent of Peace, supra note 73, at 333-35 (noting abolitionists criticized both slavery and fought
to end corporal punishment of children); Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra note 83, at 422-23
(hypothesizing that corporal punishment has its roots in slavery).
119. Among the forty national organizations opposed to school corporal punishment are the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the American Bar Association, the American Medical
Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American Psychological Association, the
National Association of Elementary School Principals, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the National Association of Social Workers, the National
Education Association, the National Mental Health Association, the National Association of
School Nurses, the National Association of School Psychologists, and the National Association of
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banned this punishment, 120 now more than half of the states prohibit
it.121  In short, the standards of decency and humanity have been
shifting rather dramatically against physical chastisement of children in
American schools.
At times and on an unpredictable basis, the Supreme Court has also
consulted international and foreign law in order to define the evolving
standards of decency in a given period. 122 If the Court was to use this
interpretive technique in a relitigation of school corporal punishment
under the Eighth Amendment, I suspect that the Justices would be
shocked at what they would find. At least five human rights treaties
have been authoritatively construed to implicitly prohibit not just school
corporal punishment of children but all corporal punishment of
children. 123  Those treaties are the United Nations Convention on the
State Boards of Education. Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS): U.S.
Organizations Opposed to School Corporal Punishment, at http://www.stophitting.org/
disatschool/usorgs.php (last visited Sept. 26, 2004).
120. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (referring to Massachusetts and New
Jersey as the only two states that had outlawed all corporal punishment in the public elementary
and secondary schools as of 1977).
121. See Center for Effective Discipline, States Banning, supra note 56 (observing that
currently twenty-six states have banned corporal punishment and nine other states have more than
half of all students in districts with no corporal punishment).
122. DAVID WEISSBRODT ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY, AND
PROCESS 740-42 (3d ed. 2001).
123. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 28th Sess., 5 36, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/l/Add.79 (2002) (recommending that, under Article 10 of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, corporal punishment of children in families should be
forbidden); Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Paraguay,
28th Sess., 55 31-32, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.166 (2001) (interpreting Article 19 of the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child as prohibiting corporal punishment of children); General
Observations of the European Committee of Social Rights Regarding Articles 7, Para. 10, and 17,
Conclusions XV-2, Vol. 1, at 26-29 (2001) (observing that Article 17 of the European Social
Charter and the European Social Charter (revised) bar corporal punishment of children);
Conclusions of the European Committee of Social Rights Concerning Articles 2-4, 7-11, 14-15,
and 17-18 of the Charter in Respect of Poland, Conclusions XV-2, Vol.2, at 407, 468 (2001)
(inquiring whether Poland has enacted legislation banning all corporal punishment by children so
as to comply with Article 17 of the European Social Charter); Concluding Observations of the
Human Rights Committee: Guyana, 68th Sess., 5 12, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.121 (2000)
(urging that, under Article 7 of the International Coveneant on Civil and Political Rights, Guyana
"should take legal and other measurs to eliminate this practice [of corporal punishment of
children]"); Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United Kingdom and
Northern Irealnd-the Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man, 68th Sess.
§ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add. 119 (2000) (recommending, under Articles 7 and 10 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "the adoption of legislation to outlaw
corporal punishment" of children on the Isle of Man); General Comment No. 13 of the Committee
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 21st Sess., 5 41, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999)
(construing Article 13, paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights to prohibit school corporal punishment); Concluding Observations of the
School Corporal Punishment
Rights of the Child, 124 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 125 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 126  the European Social Charters, 127  and the American
Convention on Human Rights.128 That corporal punishment is a human
rights law violation marks the evolving standards of decency in the
international community with respect to right treatment of children and
reflects an advance in our comprehension as to what is "humane justice"
toward children. As such, this body of human rights law should infuse
the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of whether and how
the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment applies to corporal punishment in public schools.
Similarly, if the Court in this hypothetical relitigation was to refer to
the laws of foreign jurisdictions, it would learn that, as of this writing,
fourteen countries have banned all corporal punishment of children
within their respective borders. Those countries are Sweden, Finland,
Norway, Denmark, Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Iceland, Croatia, Latvia,
Bulgaria, Israel, Ukraine, and Romania. 129 In addition, all industrialized
countries except, the United States and one state in Australia, have
banned school corporal punishment of children. 130  These facts too are
Committee on the Rights of the Child: Japan, 18th Sess., 5 45, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add. 90
(1998) (reading Article 19 of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child as prohibiting
corporal punishment of children); Annual Report: Areas in Which Steps Need to Be Taken
Towards Full Observance of the Human Rights Set Forth in the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man and the American Convention on Human Rights, 1994 INTER-AM.
Y.B. ON H.R. (INTER-AM. COMM'N ON H.R.) 690, 704 (stating that full compliance with the
American Convention on Human Rights necessitates that states' parties should ratify the U.N.
Convention on the Rights of the Child so as to ensure that children "are not the targets of
violence."). See also Bitensky, Agent of Peace, supra note 73; Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra
note 83, at 388-421 (observing that international human rights treaties "employ language that,
either explicitly or implicitly obligates both the public and private sector to observe human
rights").
124. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 49 (A/44/49), at 166, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989), available at
http://www./unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm.
125. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), Annex,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
126. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), Annex 1, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
127. European Social Charter (Revised), May 3, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 31, European Social
Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 519 U.N.T.S. 89.
128. American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/Ser. L.V/II.82, doc. 6 rev. 1, at 25 (1992).
129. See Bitensky, Agent of the Peace, supra note 73; see also Bitensky, Spare the Rod, supra
note 83, at 361-86 (recounting that as of 1998, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Austria, and
Cyprus had enacted bans on all corporal punishment of children and Italy's highest court had
issued a decision to that effect).
130. See Center for Effective Discipline, Discipline at School (NCACPS): Facts About
Corporal Punishment Worldwide, at http://www.stophitting.org/disatschool/worldwide.php (last
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persuasive evidence of evolving modern standards of
decency-evidence available to inform any reconsideration of whether
the Eighth Amendment should apply to corporal punishment in the
public schools and, if so, whether the amendment's application should
dictate the abolition of the practice.
V. CONCLUSION
Ideally, what I would like to see happen is a relitigation of the Eighth
Amendment issue using the interpretive technique and current
information described above. Again, in the best of all possible worlds, I
would like to see the Supreme Court hold that Ingraham is no more and
that the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments not
only applies to public school corporal punishment, but actually forbids
it. Without reading the ban into the Eighth Amendment, states will
remain free to permit public school corporal punishment. Granted, in
the absence of a constitutional ban, additional states could exercise the
political will to enact their own prohibitions on public school corporal
punishment, but this piecemeal approach could take forever, and some
states might never embrace such a legal reform. In the meantime, in the
intransigent states, Brown I's quality education and psychological
enabling components would continue to be undercut, and African-
American schoolchildren would continue to suffer the educationally
disabling consequences. Neither of these results seems tolerable as a
constitutional or a moral matter.
Of course, repudiating Ingraham and recognizing a prohibition on
corporal punishment of public schoolchildren in the Eighth Amendment
will not by itself be a nostrum for all that ails Brown I or the education
of African-Americans. Taking these steps is just that-some steps in
the right direction. The problems posed in implementing Brown I and
doing justice to black students in comparison to white students are
complex and call for a multiplicity of ameliorative responses. The steps
that I have proposed, however, at least remove one obstacle to and
provide one prerequisite for the consummation of Brown I and the fuller
blossoming of black schoolchildren's intellectual lives.
visited Sept. 12, 2004). Until January 30, 2004, Canada was also one of the only industrialized
countries to allow school corporal punishment. Id. However, on that date, the Supreme Court of
Canada decided a case in which it held, among other things, that school corporal punishment
would no longer be legal in that nation. Canadian Found. for Children, Youth and the Law v.
Canada, (Att'y Gen.), [2004] S.C.R. 76, available at http://www.canlii.org/
ca/cas/scc/2004/2004scc4.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004).
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